INTRODUCTION

At the June 2004 Emergency Management
Higher Education Conference, 1 several professors who teach emergency management (EM) in colleges and universities throughout the United States examined a fundamental question: Is there a recognized and widely accepted theory of EM? Their conclusion was an emphatic "no!" This conclusion was reflected in all four of the conference's "kick off" papers. [2] [3] [4] [5] However, these same papers also expressed the view that other disciplines provided concepts, frameworks, and perspectives helpful to EM practitioners. Pine articulated this best: "Emergency management clearly includes theoretical contributions from the sciences, engineering, and the social sciences-psychology, sociology, geography and anthropology" (p. 3). 4 Among the illustrations he provided were organizational culture theory, systems theory, sustainable development theory, and rational choice theory. Clearly, each of these theoretical frameworks provides emergency managers with food for thought. But equally apparent is that none of them alone constitutes a true theory of EM.
Other researchers pursue a similar vein. Sylves 5 illustrated how principal-agent theory and several analyses of bureaucracy by political scientists could sharpen the analytical skills of emergency managers. McEntire 2 argued persuasively that a concept of vulnerability might provide a framework for emergency managers whereby they could integrate observations from numerous disciplines ranging from geography and sociology to meteorology and engineering. He defined theory in terms ranging from "ideal or preferred conditions" to "typologies" to "an explanation of causal relationships." In contrast, Sylves 5 cautioned that, although theory is the engine of knowledge creation, "developing and testing theories and deciding what constitutes knowledge may well be determined by the authorities and interests that win accrediting and certification powers" (p. 28). 5 Most sociologists, however, would agree with Kreps and associates, 6 who define theory as "that [which] isolates core concepts, establishes laws of interaction among them, and specifies logical and empirical boundaries for these concepts and laws" (p. 19) (See also Stinchcombe 8 and Dubin 9 ). Why is theory important to any profession, including EM? According to Sylves, "Abstract reasoning produces measurable, generalizable knowledge that can be validated in many contexts." 5 In other words, emergency managers are required to draw upon concepts from several disciplines to practice their profession. In doing so, they should keep in mind several distinctions, one of which is that a theory of EM differs from theories relevant to EM. Similarly, a theory of disaster responses may overlap with, but is not the same as, a theory of EM or a theory of homeland security. The range of behaviors that are the objects of study differ.
NORMATIVE THEORIES
There are a number of normative theories that are useful to emergency managers. These theories are designed to specify actions that emergency managers ought to take. It is assumed that effectiveness will be enhanced if they are followed. Most important among these is the collection of ideas commonly referred to as comprehensive EM.
9 Through a series of common managerial functions-i.e., mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery-emergency managers can organize their programs into an allhazard approach by implementing a series of broad strategies and specific tactics. 10, 11 Multiyear planning can be guided by the "integrated EM" framework proposed by McLoughlin 12 and numerous other guidance documents prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) over the years. 13 Specific steps in building community-risk reduction programs have been formulated, as have tactical management models such as the incident command system (ICS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 14, 15 Other components and strategies have been implemented specifically for emergency operations centers (EOCs). Each of these normative theories is relevant to EM and provides emergency managers with important theoretical foundations.
BROAD THEORIES
Within the social sciences, there are numerous broad perspectives that contribute to substantive theory; i.e., theory formulated to explain and predict human behavior. Among those most useful to emergency managers are the ideas of such scholars as Stallings 16 (social constructionism used to interpret the "manufacturing" of earthquake threats); Jenkins 17 (social constructionism used to interpret the "manufacturing" of terrorist threats); Dynes 18 (application of structural-functional theory to interpret community responses to disaster events); Quarantelli 19 (application of symbolic interactionism to interpretations of disaster images held by the public); Aguirre et al. 20 (a test of aspects of emergent norm theory using the 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center); Barton 21 (interpretation of the rise of the postdisaster altruistic community using collective stress theory); Denis 22 (applications of organizational theory in disaster response agencies); Arata et al. 23 (predictions of the psychological impact of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, i.e., the "Conservation of Resources" stress model); Mileti 24 (sustainability perspective); and Enarson et al. 25 (social vulnerability approach to the root causes of disaster within existing social structures). Many other examples could be cited, of course, but this partial list illustrates two points. First, there is an abundance of broad theoretical orientations to aid researchers in framing research questions, to link together aspects of diverse disciplines, and to provide important and useful insights about human behavior to emergency managers. 26 Second, selected aspects of
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The these broad perspectives may provide the basis for "true" theories of EM and disaster response. Collectively, they offer a foundation; but the house, so to speak, has yet to be built. 27 Similarly, when disaster warnings are issued, the social factors that cause some people to respond in one way while others behave differently have been documented carefully during hurricanes, 28 floods, 29 and a variety of other types of disasters. 30 Each of these microtheories can be useful to emergency managers. Eventually, they may be blended together to provide a comprehensive view of human response to disaster within its full life cycle. But again, none of these comprises a specific theory of EM.
MICROTHEORIES
Past research in selected areas has provided useful microtheories wherein numerous specific concepts have been organized into multivariate theoretical models that appear to have relatively good predictive power for very narrow ranges of behavior. Although several examples might be cited, two of the best developed pertain to risk communication and disaster warning responses. Thus, we have a pretty good handle on the range of social factors that guide sectors of the public in differential, but predictable, ways when they encounter risk information.
EMBRYONIC THEORIES
Early comparative analyses of disasters underscored the central role of emergent systems in disaster response. Drabek and McEntire 31 summarized additional studies completed over the past decade, highlighting the relevance of key findings to emergency managers. They noted that one set of investigations had resulted in a preliminary model of disaster response. Focusing on the Disaster Research Center (DRC) at the University of Delaware's typology of groups responding to disasters, Kreps et al. 6 reanalyzed extensive interview data collected after numerous disasters by DRC staff. They conceptualized disaster response systems by identifying four elements of social structure, hypothesizing that domains and tasks are the structural ends of organizations while resources and activities are the structural means.
Their analysis indicated that combinations of these four elements-domains, resources, activities, and tasks (DRAT)-could be used successfully to identify different types of emergent systems. They concluded their work with the specification of an expanded theory of disaster, organization, and role. 6 In their framework, pre-and postdisaster processes are interrelated so that individual and structural outcomes can be explained and predicted. They included such exogenous factors as event and community characteristics and attributes of both the enacting unit (i.e., the emergency system) and the individual participants. While very sketchy at present, the basic thrust of this approach and the type of goal envisioned clearly point toward a significant research agenda.
I followed the work of Kreps and his team for several years and tried to relate it to my own field experiences and efforts to conceptualize postdisaster emergent multiorganizational networks (EMONS). 32 Most recently, I integrated interviews with 62 local emergency managers following their dates with disaster. 33 These events occurred between the end of 1999 and the first two months of 2001. After documenting 26 coordination strategies described by these emergency managers, I created a series of multivariate models to document the social factors that most constrained response effectiveness. These analyses influenced my eventual conceptualization of a theoretical model of disaster response effectiveness.
While complex, this model links the various social forces impacting the intergovernmental systems that emerge following a disaster. Thus, federal EM policies reflect extrasocietal social trends such as population shifts, extra-societal disaster events such as the 2004 tsunami, intrasocietal social trends ranging from the aging US population to the increase in single-parent households, and extra-community events like the attacks on September 11, 2001 . Federal policies, like the outer layers of skin on an onion, establish a powerful network of constraints for state and local EM policy. It is within this context that local emergency managers seek to implement strategies to nurture agency integrity and build interagency relationships. These efforts, of course, are constrained further by local community social trends and recent local disaster events. These social forces define the vulnerabilities and preparedness capacities of predisaster EM networks within any local community. When threatened with disaster, local emergency managers seek to implement, with varying degrees of awareness and success, a series of strategies to guide the multiorganizational networks that form to accomplish such activities as warning, evacuation, response, restoration, and recovery.
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This model is not a theory of EM. Rather, its goal is less ambitious-to explain and predict the alternative multiorganizational networks that form after a disaster occurs. By expanding the model in a variety of ways, such as including the activity sets that reflect mitigation and preparedness actions, a more general theory of EM might be obtained. Although I focused only on natural disasters, terrorist attacks, like other conflict-based events, could be added easily as the agencies that comprise the emergent networks change. This "big picture" look at the changing patterns of constraint within which emergency managers operate may appear to be complex at first glance; however, I am convinced that it can provide a useful starting point in developing a comprehensive strategy of EM.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I offer five observations. First, the goal of constructing a general theory of EM should be a top priority within the disaster research community. We are not there yet, although many promising leads have been identified. In the meantime, there are numerous streams of theory, both normative and substantive, both macro and micro, that can assist emergency managers in the practice of their profession.
Second, variety in approach and perspective should be encouraged. We need to listen to wise men like Quarantelli, 34 who urge us to confront fundamental questions such as what constitutes a disaster. Such matters are of real importance as we seek to understand the social processes whereby some events are defined as disasters and others are not. Progress will best be made through expanded dialog and focused work. Temptation for premature closure must be resisted.
Third, we should seek to expand our horizons beyond the provincialism of the past. The EM community wisely renamed its association several years ago to reflect a new vision-i.e., the International Association of Emergency Managers. Dynes 35 emphasized this theme recently when he pointed out that most disaster events (depending, of course, on your definition of disaster) have not been focused on by the research community. "The existing research tradition is predominantly Western, community-based, urban, and deals with sudden onset agents from 'natural' causes" (p. 2). My model reflects this criticism, and, hence, it may have limited utility in places where most humans are dying or being displaced. Places like Somalia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Iraq must be brought within our boundary of discourse in addition to domestic disasters.
Fourth, we must be very careful not to oversimplify our analyses. For example, in his plea to illustrate the centrality and usefulness of the concept of vulnerability, a position with which I am in full agreement, McEntire 2 proposed that, from a homeland security standpoint, "vulnerability is due to cultural misunderstandings, permeable borders, fragile infrastructure, and weak disaster management institutions" (p. 12). However, he then proposed that the implicit recommendations include correcting domestic and foreign policy mistakes. About such matters, I suggest there may be dissent as to which actions were mistakes and what would constitute correction.
Finally, social criticism must be differentiated from empirical tests of theory. At times, this boundary is problematic. Since its origins, especially within the United States, sociologists have offered critiques of structures they viewed as failing. Racial, economic, and gender-related injustices have been highlighted as has the greed and ignorance that nurture the social systems perpetuating these hurtful realities. Various types of "observations" have also been offered by those who study disasters. 36 The first book published by the Disaster Research Center, for example, pinpointed "operational problems" stemming from inadequate interorganizational coordination and communication. 37 Repeatedly, Dynes and others [38] [39] [40] have critiqued the planning and preparedness actions 41 prepared a hard-hitting critique of the newest EM tool: "The current Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) does not draw from years of social science study and does not benefit the nation. It is not a warning system. At best, HSAS is a mitigation and anticipatory public relations tool" (p. 15).
Emergency managers will always work within arenas of conflict and disagreement. Their contributions reflect their skill in negotiating consensus so that portions of the public can be safer in a world of increased risk and instability. Greed, economic injustice, ethnic hatred, and other such conditions will not suddenly disappear despite the best efforts of the best emergency managers. Vulnerability and risk must be broadly conceptualized as must proposed ameliorative actions.
Furthermore, all such actions must be evaluated within the context of other social problems confronting communities. 42 Protecting children from an assumed earthquake risk at the expense of the quality of their schools is self-defeating in the long run, both for the public and the EM profession. As Dynes 35 put it, "The lack of research attention to disaster events that result in enormous human costs in developing countries perhaps make our current research an example of trivial pursuits" (p. 2). Surely, the 2004 tsunami that brought so much destruction to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and elsewhere accented his plea. Let us not continue the pursuit of the trivial. On the other hand, let us remember also that we must walk before we can run. We are just now taking our first steps toward a long-term but worthwhile goal.
